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Abstract: Two agents make a trade-off between production and safety 
investment, fighting for joint production. Ceteris paribus, if agent 1 has a 
higher unit cost of production, lower emphasis on safety causes more fighting 
and higher utility for agent 1, and less production and safety effort by agent 1. 
Keywords: production; safety; fighting; risk. 
Risk and safety issues gain importance in today’s world, but have not received much 
attention in economics.1 This article intends to change that with a simple model. Two 
agents convert resources into production, safety investment, and fighting.2 The trade-off 
between production and safety takes the Cobb-Douglas form. Firms face risks due to 
internal factors related to production, equipment failure, human failure, interaction with 
other firms, crime, theft, espionage, hacking, blackmail, terrorism. 
Safety concerns are often considered as constraints imposed by law and regulations. 
In contrast, Asche and Aven (2004) argue “that safety measures have a value in an 
economic sense”, and Viscusi (1986) considers market incentives for safety. Recent 
changes in US accounting laws have made CEOs liable to legal malpractice if accounting 
information is fraudulent. Firms with finite resource constraints are thus led to determine 
optimal investments in information assurance technologies versus production 
technologies. The former reduces the risk of legal malpractice. This article intends to 
understand the factors that influence the trade-off between safety and productive 
investment. 
Each agent i has a resource Ri (e.g., a capital good, or labour) transformable into three 
kinds of efforts. The first is productive effort Ei designed to generate production from 
resources currently controlled. The second is fighting effort Fi designed to acquire the 
production of others, or repel others as they attempt to do the same. The third is safety 
effort Gi designed to ensure safe production. With unit conversion costs ai, bi, ci of 
transforming Ri into Ei, Fi, Gi, this gives 
( )i i i i i i i i i i i i i iR a E b F c G E R b F c G a= + + ⇒ = − − (1)
Without risk, assume a simple production function where agent i produces Yi = Ei, with 
no need for safety effort.3 With risk, the production function is 
( )( )1 1 , [0, 1]i i i i i i i i i iY E G R b F c G a Gββ β β β− −= = − − ∈  (2)
where β is a parameter that scales the importance of productive effort relative to safety 
effort. β = 1 means no safety effort. As β decreases from 1, safety effort gains increased 
importance, and the agent faces a trade-off between Ei and Gi. As a practical aid it may be 
convenient to think of production as generating a consumption good such as oil, and the 
resource Ri as a capital good such as oil drilling equipment. Alternatively, the product 
may be a consumption good such as fish, and the resource Ri a capital good such as 
fishing nets. 
The total production Y1 + Y2 is placed in a common pool for capture.4 The two agents 
fight with each other for the total production. Agent i gets a ratio ( )1 2 ,m m miF F F+  
known as the contest success function (e.g., Skaperdas, 1996), where m is the 
decisiveness parameter.5 Multiplying this ratio with the total production gives the utility 
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To determine the first order conditions, agent 1 chooses F1 and G1, and agent 2 chooses 
F2 and G2, simultaneously and independently, to maximise utility. The FOCs are 
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Inserting (5) into (4), the two equations in (4) imply 
b F mR b2F2 m− +( 1( )) b+ Fm m+ +1 1 (mR1 1 1 )1 1 2 2 2 b F− m( 1+ ) 0= (6)
With symmetry, this gives 
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Proposition 1: With symmetry, increased fighting decisiveness m increases fighting 
concavely, and decreases production, safety effort, and utility convexly. Production is 
proportional to β, safety effort is proportional to 1 – β, and all efforts are inverse 
proportional to their unit costs and proportional to the resource. The utility is proportional 
to ββ(1 – β)1 – β, which is U formed with minimum at b = 1/2, inverse proportional to the 
weighted product aβc1 – β of unit costs, independent of the unit cost of fighting, and 
proportional to the resource. 
Increased unit cost b of fighting reduces fighting by both agents, with no impact on the 
utility with decisiveness m = 1, (4) solves to 
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where E1, E2, G1, G2 follow from (1) and (5). 
Proposition 2: Ceteris paribus, if agent 1 has a higher unit cost of production (a1 > a2), 
lower emphasis on safety (higher β) causes more fighting and higher utility for agent 1, 
∂(F1 / F2) / ∂β > 0, where F1 / F2 = U1 / U2 > 1, and less production and safety effort by 
agent 1, ∂(E1 / E2) / ∂β <0, ∂(G1 / G2) / ∂β <0, E1 / E2 < 1, G1 / G2 < 1. 
Ceteris paribus means that all the other parameters for the two agents are equal. 
Proposition 2 is partly related to Hirshleifer’s (1991, p.177) paradox of power which 
states that “poorer or smaller combatants often end up improving their position relative 
to richer or larger ones…. The explanation is that initially poorer contenders are 
rationally motivated to fight harder, to invest relatively more in conflictual activity”. In 
Proposition 2, the poorer contender is the one with the higher unit cost of production. The 
novelty of Proposition 2 is to determine the impact of accounting for safety. With lower 
emphasis on safety, the impetus to focus on production becomes stronger. However, 
agent 1 is already disadvantaged by the higher unit cost of production, and becomes more 
disadvantaged by the lower emphasis on safety. Consequently, agent 1 fights harder 
relative to agent 2. Conversely, with higher emphasis on safety (lower β), agent 1’s 
production disadvantage is partly offset. Agent 1 still fights more than agent 2, but not so 
much more. 
Proposition 3: Ceteris paribus, if agent 1 has a higher unit cost of safety effort (c1 > c2), 
lower emphasis on safety (higher β) causes less fighting and lower utility for agent 1, 
∂(F1 / F2) / ∂β <0, where F1 / F2 = U1 / U2 > 1, and more production and safety effort by 
agent 1, ∂(E1 / E2) / ∂β > 0, ∂(G1 / G2) / ∂β > 0, E1 / E2 < 1, G1 / G2 < 1. 
Proposition 3 is the opposite of Proposition 2. Agent 1 is now disadvantaged by a higher 
unit cost of safety effort. This induces him to fight harder than agent 2. Lower emphasis 
on safety makes agent 1 less disadvantaged. He still fights more than agent 2, but not so 
much more. 
The upshot of Propositions 2 and 3 is that if agent 1 is disadvantaged by higher unit 
costs of production or safety effort, he will fight harder than agent 2. His fighting 
gets reduced by higher safety emphasis if disadvantaged with respect to unit cost of 
production, and gets reduced by lower safety emphasis if disadvantaged with respect to 
unit cost of safety effort. 
Inserting equal parameters a1 = a2 and c1 = c2 into (1), (5), (8) gives 
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Proposition 4: Ceteris paribus, if agent 1 has a higher unit cost of fighting 
(b1 > b2), he fights less, produces less, and invests less in safety than agent 2, 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1/ / / / / ,E E G G F F U U b b= = = =  independently of the emphasis on 
safety. 
In this case, agent 1 is disadvantaged where it hurts most, namely in his ability to fight. 
He responds by lowering not only his fighting effort, but also by lowering his production 
effort and safety effort equally much, although he is not disadvantaged in those respects. 
He consequently suffers lower utility. The trade-off between investment in production 
versus safety effort plays no role due to the equal parameters. 
Proposition 5: Ceteris paribus, if agent 1 enjoys a higher resource than agent 2 
(R1 > R2), he produces more and invests more in safety effort, E1 / E2 = G1 / G2 = 
(3R1 / R2 – 1) / (3 – R1 / R2), but fights equally much and receives the same utility as 
agent 2, F1 / F2 = U1 / U2 = 1. 
This result follows since the joint production is placed in a common pool for capture. As 
agent 1 gets advantaged by a higher resource, agent 2 cuts down on production and safety 
effort in order to match agent 1’s fighting. The two fighting levels are matched causing 
equal utilities until agent 2 at the extreme produces nothing and invests nothing in safety 
effort. For the uncommon case that all parameters are equal except that R1 > 3R2, a corner 
solution follows where agent 2 allocates all his resources to fighting. The two agents thus 
fight exclusively over agent 1’s production, where agent 1 fights more and enjoys higher 
utility. Table 1 exemplifies the propositions. 
Table 1 Exemplification of Propositions 2–5 
E1 / E2 G1 / G2 F1 / F2 = U1 / U2 
a1 = 2a2, β = 1/2  0.42 0.84 1.19
a1 = 2a2, β = 3/4  0.38 0.76 1.30
c1 = 2c2, β = 1/2 0.84 0.42 1.19 
c1 = 2c2, β = 3/4 0.92 0.46 1.09 
b1 = 2b2 0.71 0.71 0.71
R1 = 2R2 5 5 1
References 
Asche, F. and Aven, T. (2004) ‘On the economic value of safety’, Risk Decision and Policy, Vol. 9, 
No. 3, pp.253–267. 
Calow, P. (Ed.) (1998) Handbook of Environmental risk assessment and management, Blackwell 
Sciences, Oxford. 
Feber, D.J., Feldmeier, J.M. and Crocker, K.J. (2003) ‘The economic effects of road safety 
improvements: an insurance claims analysis’, Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 70, No. 4, 
pp.651–664. 
Fischhoff, B., Lichtenstein, S., Slovic, P., Derby, S.L. and Keeney, R.L. (1981) Acceptable Risk, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Grossman, H.I. (1991) ‘A general equilibrium model of insurrections’, American Economic 
Review, Vol. 81, No. 4, pp.912–921. 
Hausken, K. (2005) ‘Production and conflict models versus rent seeking models’, Public Choice, 
Vol. 123, No. 1, pp.59–93. 
Hirshleifer, J. (1991) ‘The paradox of power’, Economics and Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp.177–200. 
Hirshleifer, J. (2001) The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Jones-Lee, M.W. (1989) The Economics of Safety and Physical Risk, First Blackwell, Oxford. 
Kotz, H. and Schafer, H-B. (1993) ‘Economic incentives to accident prevention: an empirical 
study of the German sugar industry’, International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 13, 
No. 1, pp.19–33. 
Oi, W.Y. (1974) ‘Economics of product safety’, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 5, No. 2, 
pp.689–695. 
Oi, W.Y. (1995) ‘Safety at what price’, American Economic Review, Vol. 85, No. 2, pp.67–71. 
Rose, N.L. (1990) ‘Profitability and product quality – economic determinants of airline safety 
performance’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 5, pp.944–964. 
Skaperdas, S. (1996) ‘Contest success functions’, Economic Theory, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp.283–290. 
Skaperdas, S. and Syropoulos, C. (1997) ‘The distribution of income in the presence of 
appropriative activities’, Economica, Vol. 64, No. 253, pp.101–117. 
Swinbank, A. (1993) ‘The economics of food safety’, Food Policy, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp.83–94. 
Thomas, S. (1999) ‘Economic and safety pressures on nuclear power: a comparison of Russia and 
Ukraine since the break-up of the Soviet Union’, Energy Policy, Vol. 27, No. 13, pp.745–767. 
Viscusi, W.K. (1986) ‘Market incentives for safety’, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 63, No. 4, 
pp.133–138. 
Notes 
1 See Calow (1998), Fischhoff et al. (1981), and Jones-Lee (1989) for economic approaches to 
safety. Much literature focuses on public safety. See Feber et al. (2003) for the economic 
effects of road safety improvements, Swinbank (1993) for the economics of food safety, 
Thomas (1999) for economic and safety pressures on nuclear power, Rose (1990) for 
economic determinants of airline safety, Oi (1974, 1995) for the economics of product safety, 
Kotz and Schafer (1993) for economic incentives to accident prevention. 
2 Simpler models without safety investment have been analysed in the economics and conflict 
literature. See e.g., Hausken (2005), Hirshleifer (2001), Grossman (1991) and Skaperdas and 
Syropoulos (1997). 
3 This amounts to inserting h = 1 in Hirshleifer’s (1995a, p.31) production function. 
4 This assumption, caused by a need for simplicity and analytical tractability, is often realistic, 
but not always. 
5 m = ∞ means winner takes all, m > 1 gives a disproportional advantage of appropriating or 
defending more than the other agent, m = 1 means proportional distribution, 0 < m < 1 gives a 
disproportional advantage of appropriating or defending less than the other agent, m = 0 
causes equal distribution between the agents, and m < 0 means punishing appropriating or 
defending. 
